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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BRAD RUSSELL CHILDS, ] 
Plaintiff/Appellee, ] 
vs. 
HEATHER T. CHILDS, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
i Court of Appeals No. 970258-CA 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLANTS 
I. APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h) and pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 3. 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A. Did the plaintiff have sufficient basis to claim custody 
of the minor child, Alex, and whether there was an error on the 
part of the court in awarding Alex to the plaintiff. 
1* Standard of Review 
Correction of error standard. See Bailey v. Call, 767 P. 2d 
138 (Utah App. 1989), cert, denied, 773 P.2d 45 (Utah 1989). 
Whether the finding is clearly erroneous. Ashton v. Ashton, 732 
P.2d 147 (Utah 1987). 
B. Was there sufficient evidence to award custody of the 
minor children to the plaintiff or should the defendant have been 
awarded the minor children. 
1. Standard of Review 
Correction of error standard. See Bailey v. Call, 767 P.2d 
138 (Utah App. 1989), cert, denied, 773 P.2d 45 (Utah 1989). 
Sufficiency of evidence and correction of error. "Conclusions of 
law [are] accord[ed] no particular deference, but [are] 
reviewfed] for correctness." Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 
1070 (Utah 1985) (citing Automotive Manufacturers Warehouse, Inc. 
v. Service Auto Parts, Inc., 596 P.2d 1033, 1036 (Utah 1979) and 
Betenseon v. Call Auto & Equipment Sales, Inc., 645 P.2d 684, 686 
(Utah 1982)). 
C. Should the trial court have awarded a greater amount of 
alimony to the defendant. 
1. Standard of Review 
Abuse of discretion. Asper v. Asper, 752 P.2d 978 
(Ut.Ct.App. 1988). 
D. The defendant, if the court continues to allow plaintiff 
to have custody of the children, allow defendant to have and 
provide all day care for and on behalf of the minor children. 
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1. Standard of Review 
Correction of error standard. See Bailey v. Call. 767 P.2d 
138 (Utah App. 1989), cert, denied. 773 P.2d 45 (Utah 1989). 
Sufficiency of evidence and correction of error. "Conclusions of 
law [are] accord[ed] no particular deference, but [are] 
review[ed] for correctness." Scharf v. BMG Corp.. 700 P.2d 1068, 
1070 (Utah 1985) (citing Automotive Manufacturers Warehouse. Inc. 
v. Service Auto Parts. Inc.. 596 P.2d 1033, 1036 (Utah 1979) and 
Betenseon v. Call Auto & Equipment Sales. Inc.. 645 P.2d 684, 686 
(Utah 1982)) . 
E. Did the trial court award sufficient attorneys fees to 
the defendant. 
1. Standard of Review 
Abuse of discretion. Savage v. Savage. 658 P.2d 1201 (Utah 
1988) . 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
There are no constitutional provisions at issue in this 
case. 
IV. STATEMENT OP THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a final Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Decree of Divorce of the Third Judicial District 
Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Tyrone E. 
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Medley, presiding wherein after a trial held October 30, 1996 
through November 1, 1996, the Court awarded to the plaintiff the 
care, custody and control of the defendant's minor child, Alex, 
together with the care, custody and control of the parties' minor 
children, Patches and Brook. The trial court awarded alimony to 
the defendant, partial attorneys fees, but denied the defendant 
the right to provide day care for the minor children. The trial 
court made other orders dealing with debts and property but those 
are not at issue in this matter. 
B. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
(Note to reader: P = pleadings, T = trial transcript) 
The parties were married on December 14, 1990. (P at p.422) 
Prior to the marriage, the defendant had given birth to the child 
now known as Alex Childs, which child was born on January 6, 
1988. (P at p.423) The plaintiff is not Alex's biological 
father. (P at p.423) During the marriage the parties had born to 
them two children, Patches Childs, born June 12, 1991 and Brooke 
Childs, born September 8, 1993. (P at p.423) 
The defendant, from the time of the parties' marriage until 
approximately December 1994 was the primary care giver to the 
minor children. [Pursuant to Finding of Fact number 6 the trial 
court found at P-423 that the time period began in December 1993. 
This was based upon statements by the plaintiff as to defendant's 
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working and being gone at nights which work the plaintiff 
correlated to defendants employment at Village Inn. (T-541 at 
p.19.) The date of December 1993 in Finding of Fact number 6 is 
clearly in error because the plaintiff's employment at the 
Village Inn did not commence until January 1995. (T 542 at 
p.136.)] The testimony of Kim Peterson, M.S.W., the custody 
evaluator, was that the defendant, until January 1995, the 
primary care provider to the children. (T 541 at p.31.) Prior 
to January 1995, plaintiff was spending substantial periods of 
time at work and he was not home to be with the children. (T 541 
at p.31.) Prior to January 1995, the defendant was the person 
who did the housework, cleaning, shopping, taking the children to 
doctors, the laundry, preparation of meals, taking them to their 
activities, studying with Alex on his homework. (T 542 at p.157-
159) Starting approximately December 1994 to approximately March 
1995 when the Complaint was filed in this matter the plaintiff 
took a greater role in being with the children, however, the 
plaintiff's time at work continued to be a forty (40) hour work 
week plus overtime. Through February 1995 the overtime hours 
were 13 hours, 11 1/2 hours, 23 hours each week respectively and 
during the month of March 23 hours, 21 1/2 hours, 15 hours, 8 1/2 
hours and 10 1/2 hours each week respectively. (T 541 at p.173-
174.) 
00005109.98 5 
The plaintiff has always provided the financial support for 
the family. The plaintiff earned in 1994 approximately $50,000 
(T 541 at p.174). The defendant earned in 1994 the sum of 
approximately $1,300 (T 541 at p.175). The defendant had only 
been minimally employed during the marriage, based on the 
plaintiff's requiring that she not be employed. (T 542 at p.142.) 
Sometime after the marriage the defendant went to an 
attorneys' office in order to determine how plaintiff could adopt 
Alex. The plaintiff never went through any adoption proceedings 
but had his name placed upon the child's birth certificate and 
gave the child his surname. (T 542 at p.128.) It is disputed 
between the parties as to how or if the placing of the child's 
name on the birth certificate would accomplish an adoption. The 
plaintiff states that it was the defendant's idea to put the 
surname of "Childs11 on the birth certificate (T 541 at p. 12) and 
it was the defendant's position that it was the plaintiff's idea 
to put the surname of "Childs" on to the birth certificate rather 
than going through the adoption proceedings so that he would not 
have to pay attorneys fees for the costs associated with 
adoption. (T 542 at p.125-128). It is undisputed that the only 
"father" that Alex has ever known is the plaintiff. 
Marital difficulties arose upon defendant's desires to seek 
employment and plaintiff always being at work. The defendant 
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became employed as a waitress whereby she would take care of the 
children during the day and would work evenings. (T 542 at 
p.136). Because of the marital difficulties between the parties 
the defendant eventually did not come home to the marital 
residence after her work shift until such time that the plaintiff 
would leave to go to work. (T 541 at p.103) The time period 
given by the plaintiff for this course of conduct commenced 
December 1994 to the time of the filing of the divorce Complaint 
in March 1995. (T 541 at p.103). 
The plaintiff obtained custody of the children pursuant to a 
Temporary Restraining Order. (P-13-15.) Since the time of the 
Temporary Restraining Order the children have been in the custody 
of the plaintiff. Until the time of the trial the defendant 
would have the children during the day until such time that she 
went to work with the plaintiff having the children at night. 
From the time of the Temporary Restraining Order through and to 
the time of the trial defendant would commence work sometime 
between 4:00 p.nu to 6:30 p.iru Up to the time of trial it was 
the defendant who got the children to and from school. (T 541 at 
p.180). 
A custody evaluation was prepared in this matter by Mr. Kim 
Peterson, MSW. Pursuant to the report it was recommended that 
the children not be separated. (T 541 at p.42-43.) The 
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evaluation further found that each of the parties were 
appropriate parents (T 541 at p.30). The evaluator determined 
that plaintiff was slightly "better" than the defendant based 
upon the fact that he was more stable than the defendant. The 
recommendation was for joint legal custody to the parties with 
physical custody to plaintiff. Both parties were deemed to be 
fit parents and capable of having custody. (T 541 at p.30) The 
evaluator determined that if Alex was awarded to defendant then 
defendant should have all three children because it would be in 
their best interests for all three children to be together (T 541 
at p.38). The evaluator determined that the plaintiff would be 
required to provide more surrogate care than the defendant (T 541 
at p.33-34); both parties were equally likely to stop what they 
were doing to help Alex (T 541 at p.41-42); both were concerned 
about school performance of the children and from staying away 
from negative peers (T 541 at p.42); that the children were as 
happy in one home as the other (T 541 at p.42); neither party has 
relinquished custody (T 541 at p.43); the children enjoy the 
extended families from both parties (T 541 at p.43); the children 
are bonded to each party equally (T 541 at p.43); the plaintiff 
is more financially capable than the defendant, however, with 
child support to the defendant both would be more comparable on 
financial problems (T 541 at p.43); there is no preference one 
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way or the other for the children to either parent and that they 
enjoy each of them equally (T 541 at p.44); the defendant has 
been denied access to the children and her family by the 
plaintiff and the children desire to be with both sides of the 
family (T 541 at p.54); the defendant has never abandoned the 
children (T 541 at p.57). Additionally, the custody evaluator 
found that all of the children are bonded to the defendant (T 541 
at p.39); the defendant has the willingness to sacrifice her 
needs for the needs of the children but there have been times 
when both parties have put their needs above the needs of the 
children. (T 541 at p.40 and 59) It was determined by Mr. 
Peterson that the defendant was not as focussed on the children 
from approximately November or December 1994 to March 1995 with 
the plaintiff not being focussed on the children from the time of 
the marriage to November or December 1994. (T 541 at p.59) The 
evaluator determined that both parties are now very focussed on 
the children and have been since March 1995. (T 541 at p.54) The 
evaluator further found that there were no extra-ordinary 
circumstances that exist against the defendant for her not to 
have the children with her having no major flaws or personality 
problems which would prevent her from having the children. (T 541 
at p.40-41) 
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The court had found that the defendant had made disparaging 
remarks towards the plaintiff in front of the children. These 
remarks are set forth in the Findings of Fact at #22 (P at 
p.427) . The statements that were made were made supposedly to 
Kenna Howell by defendant during the month that the defendant had 
resided with her right after the court had taken the children 
from the defendant and required defendant's removal from the 
marital residence pursuant to the Temporary Restraining Order. (T 
542 at p.3). The court further found that the defendant had been 
having an extra-marital affair which was based upon the testimony 
of Kenna Howell (T 542 at p.15) and Chandra Oliver (T 542 at 
p.33) though the affair and sexual contact was denied by both the 
defendant (T 542 at p. 195) and Allen Michael Morrical, (T 542 at 
p.116) the individual with whom the defendant was supposedly 
having the affair. 
The court found and believed that the defendant was having 
an affair with Mr. Morrical and because of such it determined 
that her testimony was not worthy of belief. (Finding #22, P at 
p.427) 
The court determined that the plaintiff had been employed 
and was earning approximately $3,300 per month. The defendant 
was employed as a waitress earning $840 gross per month. (P at 
p.431) 
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The trial court determined that the defendant should be 
"estopped" from claiming that the plaintiff is not the adoptive 
father of Alex. The court additionally determined the defendant 
to be vindictive towards the plaintiff and that based upon such 
that the plaintiff should be awarded the care, custody and 
control of the parties' two minor daughters and Alex. 
The trial court awarded the defendant visitation pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-35 and the advisory guidelines pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-33 but thereafter denied the defendant the 
right to provide day care for the children which had been 
occurring prior to the time of trial. (P at p.456 which is 
paragraph 14 of the Decree of Divorce.) 
The trial court awarded alimony to the defendant and partial 
attorneys fees. 
V. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
The defendant should have been awarded the care, custody and 
control of all of the parties' minor children together with 
custody of her own son. The defendant was awarded insufficient 
alimony and insufficient attorneys fees. If this court 
determines that custody would remain with the plaintiff then the 
defendant should be allowed to provide all child care that is 




CUSTODY OF ALEX CHILDS SHOULD BE GIVEN TO DEFENDANT BECAUSE 
THERE IS A PRESUMPTION THAT CUSTODY BE GIVEN TO THE NATURAL 
PARENT AND THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE ESTOPPED DEFENDANT 
FROM ASSERTING THAT PLAINTIFF IS NOT ALEX'S FATHER. 
A. THE DEFENDANT IS NOT ESTOPPED TO CLAIM THAT PLAINTIFF 
IS NOT THE ADOPTIVE FATHER OF ALEX 
The trial court determined that it was in the best interest 
of the child, Alex, that custody be awarded to the plaintiff. 
However, this determination was in error because plaintiff is not 
Alex's parent and under Utah law there is a presumption that 
custody should be given to the natural parent. Hutchinson v. 
Hutchinson, 649 P.2d 40 (Utah 1982)(holding that in a custody 
dispute between a parent and non parent there is a presumption 
custody should be given to the natural parent). The trial court 
had entered an Order that plaintiff is not the natural or 
adoptive father of Alex on April 29, 1996. (P at p.191-192) 
Because defendant is Alex's natural parent, the parental 
presumption should apply and defendant should be given custody of 
Alex unless the plaintiff rebuts the presumption by clear and 
convincing evidence, which did not occur. (D P v. Social 
Services and Child W. Dept.. 431 P.2d 547 (Utah 1967)) 
Alex was born on January 6, 1988. The parties were married 
on December 14, 1990. Although both parties knew that the 
00005109.98 12 
plaintiff was not Alex's father, Alex's birth certificate was 
amended to show plaintiff as Alex's father. 
Defendant argues that plaintiff should not be awarded 
custody of Alex because he is not Alex's biological father and he 
never adopted Alex. The trial court, however, determined that 
the defendant should be estopped from claiming that plaintiff is 
not Alex's father. The court reasoned that both parties believed 
that plaintiff could adopt Alex by amending Alex's birth 
certificate. The court had accepted the plaintiff's statements 
that the parties had mutually agreed that the plaintiff would 
adopt Alex by placing his name on the birth certificate. The 
defendant's argument was that this was never an adoption and that 
all that was taking place was the changing of the surname of the 
child whereby he would thereby have the surname of "Childs". It 
was not an adoption. (T 542 at p.128) The parties had the birth 
certificate amended and, according to the court, plaintiff relied 
upon defendant's advice and encouragement• The court also found 
it meaningful that both of the parties and Alex had represented 
plaintiff as Alex's father. 
However, the trial court should not have estopped defendant 
from asserting that plaintiff is not Alex's father because Utah's 
adoption statutes require strict compliance and the plaintiff did 
not comply with those statutes in his attempt to adopt Alex. 
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Utah Code Annotated, Sections 78-30-1 through 78-30-19 prescribe 
the several requirements that must be met before one can adopt a 
child. Step-parents wishing to adopt their spouse's child or 
children must also comply with these statutes. Utah's adoption 
statutes contain very specific notice and consent requirements. 
Utah Code Ann. §§78-30-4.14 & 78-30-4.18. All step-parents 
wishing to adopt a spouse's child must file a petition in the 
appropriate court. Utah Code Ann. §78-30-7. It is also 
necessary that the adoptive parent or parents and the child being 
adopted make an appearance in court. Utah Code Ann. §78-30-8. 
The court is required to examine each person before it and 
determine if the adoption is in the best interest of the child 
before it can grant an order of adoption. Utah Code Ann. §78-30-
9. The legislature and Utah courts have determined that strict 
compliance with these statutes is necessary to protect the best 
interest of the child and fulfill the purposes behind the 
adoption statutes. 
The case In re; Adoption of M.L.T., 746 P.2d 1179 
(Ut.Ct.App. 1987) involved the adoption of a child by his step-
mother. The child had lived with his father and step-mother for 
over nine years and had no knowledge that his step-mother was not 
his natural mother. The step-mother requested, under the 
circumstances, the court to allow the adoption to proceed without 
00005109.98 14 
requiring the child to appear before the court as mandated by 
U.C.A. §78-30-8. 
Even under the special circumstances presented, the court 
determined that the statute should be strictly adhered to and the 
child would need to make a court appearance before the adoption 
would be granted. Specifically, the court "conclude[d] that the 
appearance requirement of the person adopting the child, the 
child adopted, and the consenting parent must be strictly 
construed and is jurisdictionally required." Id at 1180. 
Furthermore, "without compliance, the adoption could be 
nullified." Id. The court's reasoning was that the legislature 
wanted the court, and not the adoptive parents, to access whether 
adoption was in the best interest of the child. Id. Simply put, 
11
 [t]he state is interested in being assured that before a child, 
who is an innocent party, shall be adopted its interest and 
welfare must be safeguarded, and only after a district judge, set 
up by statute to protect the child, has determined that the 
child's best interest will be assured, will an order be made." 
Id. 
In Taylor v. Waddoups. 241 P.2d 157 (Utah 1952) the Utah 
Supreme Court nullified an adoption after the natural mother had 
given her signed consent and relinquished physical custody of her 
child to the adoptive parents. The mother had given her signed 
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consent before a notary public but the adoption statutes required 
such consent be given before the court. Id. at 158-60. The court 
construed the requirements of the adoption statute strictly and 
determined that the consent was not legal because it was not 
signed in the presence of the court. Id. at 160. As a result, 
the natural mother was entitled to have her child returned to 
her. 
In the present case, plaintiff did not follow required the 
statutory procedures for adopting Alex. Although plaintiff 
stated that he believed that he could adopt Alex by amending the 
birth certificate, this is not sufficient to effectuate an 
adoption. It would contravene Utah's clear and long standing 
policy that its adoption statues be strictly followed if 
plaintiff were able to stand in the same position as a natural 
parent although he never took the steps required to legally adopt 
Alex. 
Furthermore, it is against public policy to estop defendant 
from asserting that the plaintiff is not Alex's father. In Wiese 
v. Wiesef 699 P.2d 700 (Utah 1985) the Utah Supreme Court decided 
against imposing parental support responsibilities upon a step-
father through equitable estoppel. The court relied on a 
previous case, Mace v. Webb, 614 P.2d 647, 649, (Utah 1980) which 
determined that to impose support obligations upon step-fathers 
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under a theory of equitable estoppel would discourage the 
voluntary support of illegitimate children or stepchildren. 
Wiese, 699 P.2d at 703. 
In Wiese, like the present case, a child was born out of 
wedlock before the natural mother and step-father were married. 
Id. at 701. Also like the present case, the step-father in Wiese 
allowed his name to be placed on the child's birth certificate 
"to give the child a name" and believe by doing so he could avoid 
the costs of a formal adoption procedure. Id. The step-father in 
Wiese also developed a father/son relationship with the child and 
in all respects treated his step-son as his own. Id. Even after 
the natural mother and step-father divorced, the step-father 
continued his relationship with his step-son. Id. 
The natural mother sought child support from the step-
father. In response, the step-father asserted that he was not 
obligated to support the child since he was not the child's 
biological father. The mother argued that the step-father should 
be estopped from denying paternity. The court concluded that the 
step-father's conduct was insufficient to establish detriment. 
Id. Therefore, the step-father in Wiese was not obligated under 
equitable estoppel to provide child support despite his belief 
that he had adopted the child. If the step-father in Wiese was 
not obligated to provide child support, the plaintiff in the 
00005109.98 17 
present case cannot, through equitable estoppel, be given the 
full responsibilities of a natural parent. At the very least, 
defendant should be able to assert that plaintiff is not Alex's 
natural father. 
Furthermore, courts have very infrequently used the theory 
of equitable adoption. In most cases, equitable adoption is used 
when it is necessary to protect a child's inheritance rights. 
For example, in the case In re; Williams' Estate, 348 P.2d 683 
(Utah 1960) the Williamses never formally adopted Gladys Williams 
but raised her from the time she was three weeks old after they 
had entered into a contract with Gladys' biological mother to 
adopt. Several years later and after the Williamses had died, 
the administrator of the Williamses estate denied Gladys the 
portion she would have been entitled to had she been formally 
adopted. Id. at 684. 
The court noted that some allowance "should be made for the 
fact that all the parties to such contract are dead, and the 
child was an infant when the contract was made." Id. at 685. 
Because of the circumstances, the court determined that it would 
be an injustice if Gladys were not allowed to prove the existence 
of the adoption contract by circumstantial evidence. Id. There 
are no similar circumstances in the present case that would 
warrant invoking equitable adoption. In Williams' Estate Gladys 
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was denied what was rightfully hers after having been raised for 
several years by the Williamses. In the present case, plaintiff 
is in the same position as are step-parents . He loves Alex, but 
Alex is not his son because plaintiff never formally adopted him. 
Also, plaintiff's relationship with Alex does not span several 
years as Gladys' relationship did. It is tragic enough that 
plaintiff and defendant's relationship has deteriorated, but it 
would be a great injustice if custody were awarded to plaintiff 
who is no blood relation to Alex instead of the defendant who 
gave birth to Alex before she ever married plaintiff. 
Additionally, the legislature modified U.C.A. §30-5-2(1) May 
1, 1995 and took out visitation rights to children by others 
except to grandparents. Since only grandparents can have 
visitation, why would plaintiff be given greater rights such as 
custody? 
In sum, the trial court erred in its determination that the 
defendant should be estopped from asserting that the plaintiff 
was not Alex's father. The plaintiff had the opportunity to 
adopt Alex, but did not. Merely because plaintiff is listed oit 
Alex's birth certificate doesn't make plaintiff Alex's father. 
The adoption statutes require strict adherence to protect the 
best interests of the child and to insure that adoption is 
consensual. It is also important that adoption procedures be 
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strictly followed so that non-parents are not unknowingly 
obligating themselves to support their step-children as their own 
without first adopting them. Furthermore, this is not a case 
warranting equitable adoption. The parties to the supposed 
adoption are both still alive and Alex is not being deprived of 
any inheritances to which he would otherwise be entitled. Alex 
and plaintiff have a close relationship but this is no different 
than the relationship that several step-parents have with their 
step-children. There would be a great injustice if Alex were 
denied his natural right to be in the custody of his biological 
mother. As a result, the defendant should have custody of her 
son, Alex. 
B. DEFENDANT SHOULD BE GIVEN CUSTODY OF ALEX 
BECAUSE THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO REBUT 
THE PRESUMPTION THAT CUSTODY BE AWARDED TO THE 
NATURAL PARENT. 
The trial court erred in awarding custody of Alex to 
plaintiff, because there was insufficient evidence to rebut the 
presumption that custody be awarded to the natural parent. In 
Hutchinson v. Hutchinson, 649 P.2d 40 (Utah 1982) the Utah 
Supreme Court stated, fl[i]n a controversy over custody, the 
paramount consideration is the best interest of the child, but 
where one party to the controversy is a nonparent, there is a 
presumption in favor of the natural parent." Id. 649 P.2d 38, 40 
(Utah 1982). The law presumes that custody should be awarded to 
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the natural parent because "it is rooted in the common experience 
of mankind, which teaches that parent and child normally share a 
strong attachment or bond for each other, that a natural parent 
will normally sacrifice personal interest and welfare for the 
child's benefit, and that a natural parent is normally more 
sympathetic and understanding and better able to win the 
confidence and love of the child than anyone else," Id, at 40. 
While the parental presumption is not conclusive, "it cannot 
be rebutted merely by demonstrating that the opposing party 
possesses superior qualification, has established a deeper bond 
with the child, or is able to provide more desirable 
circumstances." Id. at 41. Otherwise, the parent's natural right 
to custody of its child would be illusory. Id. To rebut the 
parental presumption there must be evidence showing all three of 
the following factors: first, "no strong mutual bond exists" 
between the child and parent, second, "that the parent has not 
demonstrated a willingness to sacrifice his or her own interest 
and welfare for the child's, and [third,] that the parent lacks 
the sympathy and understanding of the child that is 
characteristic of parents generally." Id. 
In the present case, the trial court erred in its 
determination that there was enough evidence to rebut the 
parental presumption. Contrary to the rule set forth in 
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Hutchinson, the court merely determined which person would, in 
its view, be a better custodian, it did not first establish that 
defendant lacked all three qualities giving rise to the parental 
presumption. 649 P.2d 49. For example, in paragraph 18 of the 
Findings of Fact the court found it significant that "[d]efendant 
began spending less time at home... working three nights a week, 
spending time with friends on other nights and would regularly 
return home around 3:00 a.m. to 5:00 a.m." In paragraph 19, the 
court found it significant that the defendant "spent an 
increasing amount of time with a married man." Findings of Fact 
5 19. The court concluded that, "defendant's moral character is 
certainly questionable..." 
In contrast, the court determined that the "plaintiff 
provided a stable environment for the children in which the 
children appear to be thriving." Findings of Fact f 25. It also 
determined that "plaintiff is involved in the children's lives, 
is an appropriate disciplinarian and is supportive of the 
children's educational needs and extracurricular activities." 
Findings of Fact f 26. The court continued, determining that the 
plaintiff had a sound moral character and emotional stability. 
Findings of Fact f 28. 
These findings do not demonstrate that the defendant lacked 
all three characteristics giving rise to the parental 
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presumption, rather, they demonstrate, that in the court,s 
opinion, the plaintiff is a better custodian of the children than 
the defendant. The court's conclusion is arbitrary and 
constitutes an abuse of discretion. Additionally, the court's 
finding is totally contrary to that of the findings of Kim 
Peterson, M.S.W., who did the custody evaluation. Mr. Peterson 
spent substantial time periods going through everything about 
each of the parties from their homes, lives, collateral 
information, back ground information, interviews with the 
children, all directly relating to his making a recommendation to 
the court. Mr. Peterson's credentials were never disputed by 
either party, each party knowing his credentials were 
outstanding. The trial court attempts to set forth that the 
criteria in Hutchinson is rebutted but it gives absolutely no 
findings of fact which supports the court's conclusion. Mr. 
Peterson sets forth that all the children are bonded to the 
defendant; that the defendant has a willingness to sacrifice her 
needs for the needs of the children; and further that the 
defendant does not lack a sympathy for and understanding of the 
children that is characteristic of parents generally. (T 541 at 
p. 39-40) The criteria in Hutchinson has not been overcome by 
plaintiff. Mr. Peterson noted that each parent had certain 
periods of time when they were non-responsive to the family 
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wherein each had placed their needs above the needs of the 
children. The plaintiff had his needs focussed outside of the 
family from the time of the marriage to approximately November or 
December of 1994 with his focus on his work, whereas, the 
defendant's time period for her not being focussed on the family 
was from November or December 1994 to March 1995, a period of at 
most of five (5) months compared to four (4) years of the 
plaintiff. (T 541 at p.59) In addition, the court's findings are 
"flavored with bias against divorced women, an urban environment, 
and women who pursue other than the traditional role of a 
homemaker." Marchant v. Marchant, 743 P.2d 199, 203 (Ut.Ct.App. 
1987). The defendant's decision to acquire new skills and join 
the work force has no bearing on the bond or relationship she has 
with her children. Indeed, the defendant decided to improve her 
ability to make a living so that she could contribute to her 
children's financial well being as well as her own self worth. 
Marchant, 743 P.2d at 203. It is true, that defendant spent more 
time away from home because of work. However, the defendant was 
usually gone at times when the children were already asleep. Her 
absence did not interfere with the bond she had with her children 
or their needs. Some of defendant's late nights were due to the 
bitter situation at home. The defendant chose to avoid the 
plaintiff so that her children would not be exposed to the 
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friction between herself and the plaintiff. This clearly 
demonstrates the willingness of the defendant to sacrifice her 
own needs for her children's. 
Also, defendant's unsubstantiated affair does not prove that 
defendant had no strong bond with her children or that she put 
her own needs above those of her children. The court determined 
that the "defendant spent an increasing amount of time with a 
married man." Findings of Fact f 19. The court's finding 
demonstrates its bias and moral judgement against the defendant. 
It is not surprising that the defendant would seek out a friend 
to h^lp her through the difficulties she was experiencing at 
home* The fact that his friend was male does not support the 
court's conclusion that defendant had an extramarital affair. 
Mar chant,. 743 P. 2d at 204. More importantly however, even if 
defendant had an affair, there is no evidence that this affected 
the mutual bond between defendant and her children or that the 
defendant place her own needs above her children's. 
Therefore, the grant of custody of Alex to the plaintiff is 
in error because there was not sufficient evidence to rebut the 
parental presumption. Because the defendant is Alex's natural 
mother, custody cannot be awarded to a non-parent until the 
parental presumption is rebutted. Hutchinson, 649 P.2d at 42. 
Furthermore, the parental presumption cannot be rebutted by 
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evidence showing that the nonparent is merely a better custodian. 
Rather, the person challenging the parental presumption must 
present evidence showing that the parent has no strong mutual 
bond with her children, that she put her needs above the 
children's, or that she did not sympathize with or understand her 
children. No such findings were made in this case and custody 
should be awarded to defendant, Alex's natural mother. 
POINT II 
THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO AWARD THE MINOR CHILDREN 
TO THE PLAINTIFF AND THE CHILDREN SHOULD HAVE BEEN AWARDED 
TO THE DEFENDANT. 
It is set forth above, that the minor child, Alex, should 
never have been awarded to the plaintiff. It was acknowledged by 
both plaintiff and defendant that the children should not be 
separated. The testimony of Mr. Kim Peterson was that the 
children should not be separated. (T 541 at p.42-43 and P at 
p.421) Therefore, the trial court had to make a determination as 
to what should be done with the minor children and where they 
should be placed. The trial court did not want to award the 
children to the defendant and therefore has attempted to make 
findings to support the placement of the children with the 
plaintiff. There are insufficient findings for the placement of 
the children with the plaintiff. 
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The best evidence as presented at the time of trial is that 
the defendant has been vindictive towards the plaintiff and that 
she might use her vindictive beliefs against the plaintiff to 
prohibit his access to the children. Also it was stated Mr. Kim 
Peterson that the plaintiff is more emotionally stable than the 
defendant. However, in reviewing the criteria pursuant to the 
Code of Judicial Administration Rule 4-903 Mr. Peterson was very 
clear that (1) the plaintiff works excessive hours and has 
throughout the marriage; (2) the defendant has always been the 
primary care provider to the children until January 1995 when the 
plaintiff started exercising a greater role in the children's 
lives; (3) the plaintiff is more stable while both parents are 
clearly fit and capable of having custody of the children; (4) 
the plaintiff would be required to provide more surrogate care to 
the children than the defendant; (5) neither party has 
relinquished custody of the children; (6) both parties enjoy 
extended families; (7) the children are bonded equally to both 
parents; (8) plaintiff is more financially capable, however, with 
child support the defendant could make up that difference; (9) 
there is no preference one way or the other of the children to 
either parent, that each child loves and enjoys each parent 
equally; (10) the defendant has been denied access to her family 
and the children desire to be with both sides of the family; (11) 
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there are no extra-ordinary circumstance which prohibit the 
defendant from having the children. (T 541 at p.40-57) 
The testimony of the plaintiff can literally be 
characterized as setting forth that he believes that once that 
the defendant started working in January 1995 plus she was also 
having an affair with deputy sheriff Allen Michael Morrical that 
at that point she was no longer a fit and proper parent but prior 
to that time that she was a good mother. (T 541 at p.18-19 and 
103). This means she was a good mother for four years but wasn't 
for three months. 
The plaintiff had informed the court that he had modified 
his work schedule so that he could be with the children more. 
This is totally contrary to his own testimony and his own records 
setting forth that through the months of February 1995 and March 
1995 he was working between 8 1/2 to 23 hours per week overtime. 
(T 541 at p.173-174). Plaintiff's history is substantial time at 
work with an excess of 420 overtime hours in 1995. 
The trial court had to create in some fashion its desire to 
award the plaintiff the children. Without a doubt plaintiff has 
the better financial capabilities to take care of the children. 
Also, as per Mr. Peterson, he is slightly more emotionally stable 
than the defendant. But because of the fact that the children 
need to be kept together and it is the desire of the parties and 
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evaluator to have the children kept together the court thereafter 
attempts to make findings to say that the defendant should not be 
awarded the custody. The evidence does not support the findings 
or conclusions of the court. To the contrary, the evidence 
establishes that the defendant has watched the children of the 
Morrical's as well as other children in the neighborhood. 
Defendant has shown that she is willing to travel extensive miles 
each and every day to pick up the children from plaintiff, take 
the children to school, pick-up the children up from school and 
thereafter take the children back to the plaintiff when she goes 
to start work. The defendants estimated travel is approximately 
200 miles per day in order to be with the children since March 
1995. The plaintiff lives in Riverton and the defendant in West 
Valley City, all located within Salt Lake County, Utah. The 
evidence shows, in the most favorable light to plaintiff, that 
defendant has always been the primary care taker of the children 
until approximately December 1994 and that for a four to five 
month period she was not focussed on the children. The 
statements as characterized in paragraph #22 of the Findings of 
Fact (though denied by defendant) were made when the children had 
been taken from defendant pursuant to the Temporary Restraining 
Order. Those statements were at most frustration and anger and 
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correlate to defendant's emotional problems as noted by Mr. 
Peterson. 
No other "offending" statements were offered or presented 
after the March 1995 time period. The statements as allegedly 
made by the defendant against the plaintiff as been found at (T 
541 at p.132) are specifically denied by the defendant. (T 542 at 
p.160.) Additionally, Kenna Howell sent letters to the court and 
Mr. Peterson supporting defendant as the individual to receive 
custody of the children. (P at p.39) and as part of custody 
evaluation which was published at T 541 at p.22) 
The court in Finding #4 of the Conclusions of Law (at T-
p.434) states that both the plaintiff and defendant equally love 
the children and that the children have a strong equal bond with 
the plaintiff and defendant. The court thereafter concludes 
however, that defendant's bond with the children cannot be so 
strong because she has had an affair with a married man, "pursued 
her own needs to the detriment and sacrifice of the needs of her 
own minor children". The court makes no findings to support this 
conclusion. In fact as noted previously it is contrary to the 
evidence as presented by Mr. Kim Peterson. Mr. Peterson found 
that there was no verbal or emotional abuse of the children and 
that the only time period of not being focussed on the children 
was from approximately November or December 1994 to March 1995. 
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There was never any evidence that the children suffered or lost 
bonding with the defendant during the four (4) to five (5) month 
period. The children clearly love the plaintiff and defendant 
equally. The children never perceived either parent as giving 
them problems, emotional or verbal abuse, or neglect. (See 
custody evaluation and at T 541 at p. 39-42,49). The evidence 
was insufficient to award plaintiff custody of the children. The 
defendant should have been awarded custody of all the children. 
POINT III 
THE DEFENDANT WAS AWARDED INSUFFICIENT ALIMONY 
The trial court awarded to the defendant the sum of $350.00 
per month alimony for a period of a maximum of two years. It is 
acknowledged that this is a marriage of short duration however, 
the standard that the court applied sets forth that the amount of 
alimony was based upon not only the duration of the marriage but 
defendant's excellent health, youth and ability to prove her 
capacity to meet her own needs and her fault in engaging in an 
extra-marital affair. (Findings of Fact #34, P at p.432) 
Attorneys fees are allowed pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §30-3-35. 
Without any doubt the defendant has a need and the plaintiff has 
the ability to pay and defendant lacks the ability to provide 
sufficient income for herself. [See Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 
(Utah 1985)]. The defendant has been employed as a waitress 
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earning at most $840 per month and has expenses of $1,250 per 
month. (Findings of Fact #34 at P at p.431). The plaintiff is 
employed and has been earning at least $3,300 per month. He has 
claimed expenses as found by the court total approximately $2,500 
per month. (Finding of Fact #33 at P at p.431) 
Throughout the marriage the plaintiff has worked substantial 
hours with substantial overtime while the defendant has been 
minimally employed. In 1994 defendant's total income was 
approximately $1,300.00. In 1995 she commenced working as a 
waitress earning not even minimum wage. As the defendant 
testified at time of trial, her income on a two week period 
averaged between $150 and $250 per time period which included her 
tips. (T 543 at p.14) The plaintiff on the other hand, in 1994 
earned approximately $50,000. Plaintiff has always had the joy 
of working at a well paying job while the defendant has been 
employed at meager jobs. Defendant lacks education to increase 
her status in life with no prospects to improve her status in 
life. It is inappropriate for the court to make a determination 
that her alimony should solely be the sum of $350.00 per month 
for a period of two (2) years and then take the factors as stated 
in paragraph 34 of the Findings of Fact and say that those are 
the basis for the limitation. When the alimony which the 
defendant is awarded is taken into consideration with her child 
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support obligation together with the amounts that she would have 
to pay because of day care and insurance coverage on behalf of 
the children there is absolutely no realistic way at present that 
she could meet her own needs. (Asper v. Asper, 752 P.2d 978 
(Ut.Ct.App. 1988) The alimony that should have been awarded by 
the court should have been a minimum of at least $500 per month 
together with having the same extended for a period to the length 
of the marriage as contemplated pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §30-3-
5. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT, IP IT ALLOWS THE PLAINTIFF TO HAVE CONTINUED 
CUSTODY OF THE CHILDREN, SHOULD ALLOW THE DEFENDANT TO HAVE 
AND PROVIDE ALL DAY CARE FOR AND ON BEHALF OF THE MINOR 
CHILDREN. 
The trial court at the time that it published its Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law thereafter received an Objection 
to the Decree of Divorce and Request for Clarification. (P at 
p.438-44 0) Pursuant to that request defendant sought to be 
allowed to provide all day care on behalf of the minor children. 
(P at p.439) The trial court thereafter denied that request and 
entered the Decree of Divorce denying to the defendant the right 
to provide the day care on behalf of the minor children. The 
defendant had been allowed to provide the day care pursuant to 
the Temporary Restraining Order and had further been awarded that 
right purusant to the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
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when the court adopted the provisions as set forth in Utah Code 
Ann, §30-3-33 (P at p.434). (Conclusions of Law paragraph #3 P 
at p.434) (Decree of Divorce paragraph #14 P at p.456.) 
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-33(13) provides as follows: 
"Parental care shall be presumed to be better care for 
the child than surrogate care and the court shall 
encourage the parties to cooperate in allowing the non-
custodial parent, if willing and able, to provide child 
care." 
The trial court first ordered pursuant to the findings that 
§30-3-33 shall be followed and the court thereafter refused and 
has prohibited the defendant from providing the child care for 
the children. The custody evaluator stated that the parties 
should have joint legal custody and that the defendant should 
have the children and care for them in the morning with the 
parties to work out ways to share the children. Mr. Peterson had 
further set forth that the defendant needs to be highly involved 
in the children's lives. It was important for not only her to be 
involved with the children but for the children to be involved 
with her. (T 541 at p.23-25). The trial court here, however, 
refused to implement the recommendation of the custody evaluator 
and has denied the defendant any right to care for the children. 
The legislative intent of the statute was for the non-custodial 
parent to be able to provide the care for the children and in 
this case not only is it important for the children to be highly 
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involved with their mother but also because of the economic 
circumstances of the defendant it is more appropriate that she 
should be able to take care of the children rather than her 
incurring the expense of a day care, which she cannot afford. 
If this court allows the children to remain in the custody 
of plaintiff then the defendant, at the very least, should be 
allowed to provide the child care for the children. Defendant 
wants to do this and she is capable of providing the child care. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO AWARD 
THE DEFENDANT SUFFICIENT ATTORNEYS FEES. 
At the time of the trial the defendant had submitted to the 
court Exhibit #6 of her attorneys fees which were in the sum of 
$6,819. The matter was tried for two and one-half (2 1/2) days 
before the court together with other extensive work being 
performed. The affidavit as submitted by the attorney for the 
defendant and pursuant to Exhibit #6 set forth that the work and 
services as performed by the attorney were reasonable, necessary 
and well within the community standard for like work and 
services. (Sorensen v. Sorensen, 839 P.2d 774 (Utah 1992)). The 
billing rate was $120.00 per hour which is well within the 
community standard for work and services performed in this area 
of the law. Services as performed by the defendant's attorney 
were necessitated because of the legal issues which were involved 
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in this matter. There was no objection to the affidavit of 
attorneys fees and no cross-examination nor rebuttal to the 
attorneys fees. The defendant, as a waitress, is earning 
pursuant to the court's findings $840 per month. Defendant is 
without any means or ability to pay her attorneys fees. The 
award of only $1,000 of attorneys fees to the defendant are 
insufficient and inappropriate. 
The plaintiff's income being in excess of $3,300 per month 
clearly shows that he has the better means and ability to pay the 
attorneys fees than the defendant. The trial court abused its 
discretion in awarding only $1,000 in attorneys fees when the 
defendant had incurred almost seven times that amount in 
attorneys fees. The trial court found that based upon 
defendant's need and plaintiff's ability to pay that plaintiff 
was required to contribute $1,000 toward defendant's attorneys 
fees. (Findings of Fact #39, T-p.433) This amount is clearly 
insufficient and should be increase by this court. (Yelderman v. 
Yelderman. 669 P.2d 406 (Utah 1983)). 
Additionally, defendant should be awarded her attorneys fees 
incurred by her for this appeal. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The court erred when it awarded custody of Alex to the 
plaintiff. There is no basis for awarding Alex to the plaintiff 
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and the parental presumption was never rebutted by the plaintiff. 
The factors as set forth in Hutchinson v. Hutchinson were never 
rebutted to allow for the plaintiff to prevail to obtain custody 
of Alex. Both parties agree and the custody evaluator agreed 
that it is inappropriate to separate the children. The defendant 
is a fit and proper person to be awarded the custody of the 
children and that there is only slight differences between the 
parties. It is inappropriate that the plaintiff is awarded 
custody of the children rather than the defendant. This court 
should reverse the trial court's award of the children to the 
plaintiff and award all of the children to the defendant. 
The alimony award as made by the trial court is 
insufficient. The court has limited alimony to two years when 
the marriage has been in effect for six years from the time of 
marriage to the time of the entry of the Decree of Divorce. The 
defendant has the need, the defendant does not have the resources 
to meet her obligations and the plaintiff has the ability to pay. 
The amount of alimony should have been increased and should be 
for a period of at least the length of the marriage. 
The defendant should be allowed, if the court maintains 
custody of the children with the plaintiff, to provide the day 
care to the children. There is no rational basis which would or 
could be seen to have her precluded from providing the day care. 
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The defendant is a good mother, has tended other children in the 
neighborhood, has always been the primary care giver to the 
children in this matter, and to exclude her as the day care 
provider is inappropriate. This is further compounded by the 
financial obligations that would be incurred and the defendant's 
inability to pay that financial obligation. This court should 
not validate the trial court's ruling and should therefor allow 
the defendant to provide the day care. 
The trial court did abuse its discretion in failing to award 
to the defendant sufficient attorneys fees. This court should 
increase the attorneys fees awarded to the defendant to the 
amount requested at the time of trial to $6,819.00 together with 
attorneys fees for this appeal. ; 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this C*^"clay of January, 1998. 
RANDY f. LUDLOW 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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p> SALTjLAK£ COUNTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BRAD RUSSELL CHILDS, : FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiff, : 
VS. : CASE NO. 954901350 
HEATHER T. CHILDSt Z 
Defendant. : 
This matter came on for trial on October 30, 31 and November 
1, 1996, before the Honorable Tyrone E. Medley. Plaintiff appeared 
in person and through counsel of record, Harry Caston. Defendant 
appeared in person and through her counsel of record, Randy S. 
Ludlow. The Court having heard the testimony from various 
witnesses called by each party, reviewed the pleadings, custody 
evaluation and evidence introduced, and being fully advised, hereby 
enters the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff and defendant are residents of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, and have been for more than three months 
prior to the commencement of this action. 
2. Plaintiff and defendant were married on December 14, 1990 
in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and since that time have been 
husband and wife. 
CHILDS V. CHILDS PAGE TWO FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS 
3. Irreconcilable differences have arisen which will be 
explained in further detail herein which no longer make it possible 
for the parties to continue this marriage. 
4. On January 6, 1988, the defendant gave birth to the minor 
child known as Alex Childs, plaintiff is not Alex's biological 
father. 
5. During the marriage, two children were born, known as 
Patches Childs, born June 12, 1991, and Brooke Childs, born 
September 8, 1993. 
6. During the marriage and until approximately December 
1993, defendant was the primary care giver to the minor children. 
In approximately December, 1993 defendant began working three 
nights per week, spending time out at night when she was not 
working, returning home in the early morning hours. Defendant was 
spending less time at home. During this time plaintiff began 
assuming the primary care responsibilities for the children in the 
evening. 
7. During the marriage, plaintiff provided the sole 
financial support for Alex. Defendant did not seek child support 
from Alex's biological father nor did the biological father provide 
financial support, nor seek visitation or contact with Alex in any 
way. 
Mx^ 
CHILDS V. CHILDS PAGE THREE FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS 
8. Since the parties' marriage, plaintiff has been the only 
individual who has ever acted as Alex's father. Plaintiff and 
Alex have established a positive, stable, nourishing father/son 
relationship with defendant's aid, assistance, encouragement, and 
permission. 
9. Immediately after the parties married they agreed that 
plaintiff should adopt Alex. Defendant consistently told plaintiff 
and other family members that she wanted plaintiff to be on equal 
footing with all of the children in light of the mutual love, 
respect and honor shared by plaintiff and Alex. 
10. The parties sought legal advice regarding an adoption of 
Alex wherein they learned of a one year waiting requirement and 
adoption costs. At this time defendant was pregnant and the 
parties had limited financial resources and were concerned about 
adoption costs. 
11. Plaintiff and defendant were later advised that plaintiff 
could formally adopt Alex by filling in plaintiff's name on Alex's 
birth certificate and that this would be an inexpensive method of 
accomplishing the adoption. 
12. Defendant encouraged plaintiff to add his name to Alex's 
birth certificate to formalize the adoption. Plaintiff relied upon 
defendant's advice and encouragement and both parties believed that 
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the adoption could be accomplished in this manner. The parties 
completed the necessary paperwork for Alex's birth certificate to 
be amended representing plaintiff as Alex's biological father. 
13. The parties believed that plaintiff had adopted Alex. 
Throughout the marriage plaintiff, defendant, and Alex represented 
to everyone that plaintiff was Alex's father. Plaintiff relied 
upon defendant's actions wherein defendant provided the opportunity 
for plaintiff and Alex to establish a father/son relationship. 
Plaintiff and Alex would be injured if defendant were allowed now 
to assert the parental presumption because plaintiff would not 
stand on equal footing with defendant in asserting custody rights 
to Alex. 
14. Plaintiff filed a Complaint for divorce on March 31, 1995 
and requested temporary custody of all of the minor children. 
Defendant filed a Motion for Temporary Custody and Child Support 
for all minor children without any challenge to Alex's purported 
adoption. 
15. Defendant participated in the initial custody evaluation 
and did not communicate to the evaluator any challenge of 
plaintiff's purported adoption of Alex, consequently, the 
evaluation was completed on the premise that plaintiff had lawfully 
adopted Alex. 
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16. The custody evaluation was completed on September 26, 
1995 and recommended joint custody with plaintiff having primary 
physical custody of all minor children. 
17. On October 25, 1995, after receiving the unfavorable 
custody evaluation, defendant for the first time filed an Answer 
and Counterclaim challenging plaintiff's adoption of Alex and 
asserting the natural parent presumption. 
18. In approximately January 1994, defendant began spending 
less time at home. Defendant began working three nights a week, 
spending time with friends on other nights and would regularly 
return home around 3:00 a.m. to 5:00 a.m. 
19. In approximately December 1994, defendant spent an 
increasing amount of time with a married man, Allen M. Morrical. 
Defendant would spend time with Mr. Morrical during the day, either 
at her home or at Mr. Morrical's home while plaintiff was at work. 
During this time defendant would leave the marital home or work 
most evenings to spend time with Mr. Morrical, typically not 
returning to the marital home until early in the morning hours. 
20. The Court finds that defendant engaged in a close 
friendship and sexual relationship with a married man, Allen 
Morrical, based upon the late, regular evenings spent with Mr. 
Morrical and defendant's statements to Chandra Oliver that 
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defendant was "seeing Mr. Morrical for over a year." Defendant and 
Mr. Morrical shared Mr. Morrical's truck for a year, a cellular 
telephone number, a washer and dryer, and Mr. Morrical was a co-
signer on defendant's rental application. Mr. Morrical helped 
defendant meet her financial obligations. Defendant placed her 
relationship with Mr. Morrical above and ahead of her parental 
duties and responsibilities which had a negative impact on her 
minor children. 
21. The Court finds that defendant lied about her 
relationship with Mr. Morrical under oath in open court. 
Consequently, defendant's credibility as a witness is very poor. 
Having lied under oath about a material matter makes her testimony 
on other matters not worthy of belief. 
22. The Court finds that defendant regularly degrades the 
children, degrades the plaintiff in front of the children, 
resulting in emotional abuse of the children. A few examples of 
defendant's disparaging remarks made in the presence of the 
children include: 
lfI hope your dad gets in a car crash and dies." 
"Brad (plaintiff) doesn't love you." 
"I don't know why I had you fucking kids." 
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"I'm fucking sick of you kids, I'm sending you to Green 
River." 
111 don't give a fuck where plaintiff is, he is a worthless 
piece of shit anyway.11 
23. Defendant is very vindictive, and angry as established by 
her regular disparaging remarks of plaintiff in front of their 
children. The testimony of family members, friends, the custody 
evaluation, and the defendant's demeanor on the witness stand 
further establish defendant's mean, vindictive nature. Defendant's 
vindictive nature makes her far less likely to allow plaintiff to 
maintain a healthy relationship with the children if defendant was 
awarded custody. In fact, defendant has threatened to take the 
children to Mexico if plaintiff is awarded custody. Based upon 
defendant's level of anger, defendant's threat should be taken 
seriously. 
24. A custody evaluation was conducted by Kim Peterson. Kim 
Peterson concluded that the parties share joint legal custody with 
Brad's home designated as the children's primary residence. Kim 
Peterson concluded that Brad is a better choice of being the 
custodial parent. However, this Court finds that based upon 
defendant's emotional instability and uncooperativeness, joint 
custody would not be in the best interests of the minor children. 
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Furthermore, the children have strong bonds with one another and it 
is not in their best interests to be separated. 
25. Both prior to and subsequent to the parties' separation, 
the plaintiff has provided a stable environment for the children in 
which the children appear to be thriving. 
26. That the plaintiff is involved in the children's lives, 
is an appropriate disciplinarian and is supportive of the 
children's educational needs and extracurricular activities. 
27. That the plaintiff has kept the children well-dressed and 
groomed and is watchful of the children when they are in his care. 
28. Plaintiff has had custody of all the minor children for 
the pendency of this action. The award of temporary custody to the 
plaintiff was made after an evidentiary hearing. During the 
pendency of this action the children have done well in plaintiff's 
primary care. Plaintiff has assisted Alex and Patches in their 
homework and other school and extracurricular activities. The 
children's best interests are served in continuing the previously 
determined custody arrangement with plaintiff in light of 
plaintiff's demonstrated sound moral character and emotional 
stability. 
29. The Court finds that defendant's moral character is 
certainly questionable based upon her untruthful testimony, her 
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chicanery in trying to intentionally provoke plaintiff to hit her 
and defendant's conscious choice to place her individual needs and 
the demands of her extramarital affair above her children. 
Furthermore, defendant's regular swearing at the children, the 
derogatory remarks about plaintiff in front of the children and 
defendant's inability to put the needs of her children above her 
own needs demonstrate poor emotional stability. 
30. The Court finds that both parties proffered a desire for 
custody. However, plaintiff's desire for custody has been 
continual and deep. Plaintiff adjusted his work schedule so he 
could be available for the children. Plaintiff treated Alex as 
his own son without any distinction whatsoever. Plaintiff has 
maintained regular employment and is more able to provide the 
necessary resources to raise the minor children. Plaintiff has 
demonstrated the ability to place the needs of the minor children 
above his own. 
31. The Court finds that plaintiff, with the assistance of 
his extended family, can provide quality personal and subrogate 
care for the minor children. While it does appear that defendant 
has greater flexibility in her schedule, defendant does work late 
afternoon or evening shifts at Village Inn which would interfere 
with her ability to provide quality personal care. 
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32. The Court finds that defendant threatened plaintiff and 
his family that they will not see the children if plaintiff is 
awarded custody. Based upon defendant's continual harsh demeanor 
towards plaintiff and his family, the Court finds that defendant is 
not likely to allow plaintiff to maintain frequent and meaningful 
contact with the children should she be awarded custody. In fact, 
despite the excellent father/son relationship between plaintiff and 
Alex, defendant through argument of counsel, would have the Court 
deny visitation rights to plaintiff and Alex. The Court finds that 
plaintiff would be more likely to allow defendant to have frequent 
visitation with the children. 
33. Plaintiff has been employed throughout the marriage and 
is- presently earning approximately $3,300 gross per month. 
Plaintiff has decreased his work hours in order to meet the 
personal needs of the minor children. Plaintiff has reasonable 
monthly expenses in the approximate amount of $2,500 per month. 
34. Defendant is employed as a waitress, earning 
approximately $840 gross per month. Defendant has reasonable 
monthly expenses in the approximate amount of $1,250 per month. 
Defendant is in need of support from plaintiff and the plaintiff 
has the ability to pay the same, therefore, defendant is awarded 
alimony on a temporary basis in the sum of $350 per month for a 
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period of two years beginning the first of the month after entry of 
the Decree. Temporary alimony is appropriate based upon the 
duration of the marriage, defendant's excellent health, youth, and 
ability to improve her capacity to meet her own needs, and her 
fault in engaging in an extra-marital affair. 
35. The defendant should pay plaintiff child support for the 
three minor children based upon the gross income of the parties 
identified herein pursuant to the uniform guidelines beginning the 
1st of the month after entry of the decree unless otherwise agreed 
upon by the parties. 
36. The marital residence and lot have a current value of 
$125,000. The mortgage balance is $57,000. The Court cannot find 
by a preponderance of the evidence that plaintiff made a premarital 
contribution to the marital residence and lot. 
37. Plaintiff is awarded the parties' marital residence, 
subject to defendant's equitable lien in the amount of $34,000, 
said equitable lien is payable upon the earliest of the following 
occurring: 
(a) The youngest child's graduation from high school, 
18th birthday, or emancipation, whichever should occur last. 
(b) Should the plaintiff cohabitate. 
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(c) Should the plaintiff sell the home or no longer use 
the home for his primary residence. 
38. Defendant is awarded the personal property items 
identified on page 2 of Exhibit D-4. Plaintiff is awarded the 
children's furniture, refrigerator, washer, dryer, and all other 
personal property in the marital residence, including the trailers. 
Defendant is awarded the sum of $1,500 in furtherance of an 
equitable division of the marital personal property. 
39. Both parties have incurred reasonable and necessary 
attorney's fees. Based upon defendant's established need and 
plaintiff's ability to pay, plaintiff is required to contribute 
$1,000 towards defendant's attorney's fees. 
40. There are no pension or retirement plans to be 
distributed. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court finds that jurisdiction is proper and plaintiff 
should be granted a divorce from the defendant on grounds of 
irreconcilable differences to be final upon entry. 
2. The Court finds defendant should be estopped from raising 
the parental presumption. 
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3. The Court finds that even if the parental presumption 
were to apply, the presumption is rebutted and it is just and 
proper and in the best interests of all the minor children that the 
plaintiff be awarded sole legal custody of all the minor children, 
subject to defendant's visitation rights which at a minimum shall 
be as defined in Section 30-3-35. The Court also adopts the 
advisory guidelines of Section 30-3-33, Utah Code Ann. 
4* All of the children love plaintiff and defendant equally 
and deeply. The children have a strong, equal bond with plaintiff 
and defendant. Plaintiff has a strong bond and love for all of the 
children. It is also apparent that defendant loves all of her 
children. However, this Court is unable to conclude that 
defendant's bond to the children is strong, because she chose to 
have an affair with a married man and pursue her own needs to the 
detriment and sacrifice of the needs of her minor children. 
Defendant's horrendous verbal and emotional abuse of the minor 
children clearly establishes that defendant lacks the sympathy for 
and understanding of the needs of her children that is 
characteristic of parents generally. The evidence is clear and 
convincing that defendant generally lacks all of the 
characteristics that give rise to the parental presumption. 
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5. That plaintiff be entitled to the tax dependency 
exemption for the minor children. 
6. The plaintiff has available to him through his employment 
insurance coverage. He shall be required to maintain the same on 
behalf of the parties' minor children with each of the parties 
being responsible for one-half (1/2) of the insurance premium. All 
other expenses incurred on behalf of the parties' children, which 
are not covered by insurance, shall be equally borne by each of the 
parties, including all deductibles and co-pays for all medical, 
dental, orthodontic, optical and prescription costs. 
7. The defendant should be required to pay one-half of the 
plaintiff's work-related day care as is incurred on behalf of the 
parties' minor children. The plaintiff shall submit to the 
defendant verification of the monies paid out for day care within 
ten (10) days of the receipt of the same and defendant shall 
reimburse to the plaintiff one-half of the monies paid to the day 
care provider within ten (10) days of receiving verification from 
the plaintiff. 
8. Defendant is awarded a Judgment in the total amount of 
$2,500 consisting of the attorney fee award in the amount of $1,000 
and property distribution in the amount of $1,500. 
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9, That each party pay the debts they have incurred since 
their separation. 
10• That plaintiff's counsel prepare a Decree consistent with 
the Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law* 
Dated this _day of January, 1997. 
41 A^L fYROME E. MEDLEY 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, to the 
following, this A I day of January, 1997: 
Harry Caston 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
10 E. South" Temple, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Randy S. Ludlow 
Attorney for Defendant 
311 S. State/ Suite 280 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
^ ^ ^ t\lh«rtP&tf 
Urn 
ADDENDUM B 
r ~ ^  
RANDY S. LUDLOW #2011 
Attorney for Defendant 
336 South 300 East, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-13 00 
Fax: (801) 322-1628 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BRAD RUSSELL CHILDS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HEATHER T. CHILDS, 
Defendant. 
OBJECTION TO DECREE OP DIVORCE 
AND REQUEST FOR CLARIFICATION 
Case No. 954901350DA 
Judge Tyrone E. Medley 
THE DEFENDANT, by and through her attorney of record, Randy S. 
Ludlow, hereby objects to the Decree of Divorce as filed by the 
plaintiff. The Decree of Divorce was delivered on February 4, 
1997, however modification pages were sent over and delivered on 
February 6, 1997. The time to object to the same, i.e., the Decree 
of Divorce, has not expired. The plaintiff has wrongfully 
submitted to the court that the time has expired. 
1. The first objection to the Decree is that the documents as 
submitted by the plaintiff does not award to anyone a decree of 
divorce. It is necessary for the court to enter a decree of 
divorce and to state to whom the decree is awarded. This has not 
been done by the plaintiff and therefore the documents as submitted 
are not sufficient. 
2. The plaintiff has submitted in paragraph 3 that the 
premium for the insurance on plaintiff's coverage attributable to 
the children is the sum of $60.11 per month. This is the 
clarification that the plaintiff delivered on February 6, 1997. 
However, no proof or documentation as to the same was ever 
submitted or transmitted to the defendant or defendant's counsel. 
3. The plaintiff has wrongfully set forth the amount of child 
support in paragraph number 8. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-45-
7.14 the defendant falls under the "Low Income Table" and the 
appropriate amount of child support pursuant to that table is the 
sum of $184.00 per month. 
4. In regards to clarification of this matter; the court has 
set forth that the advisory guidelines pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§3 0-3-33 are to take affect. Pursuant thereto the defendant has 
requested telephone contact with the children which has been denied 
by the plaintiff and she has further requested to provide the "day 
care" for the children. This day care has further been denied by 





and a plan to allow the same to occur is appropriate in the 
circumstances. 






I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing OBJECTION TO DECREE OF DIVORCE AND REQUEST 
FOR CLARIFICATION, by placing the same in the United States Mail, 
in a postage pre-paid sealed envelope, this \^y^ day of February, 
1997 to the following: 
HARRY CASTON u 
10 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE #600 , /~ . ,/ 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84133 1 * 1 / // /^ 






8 I g T- f^  r f-; D r ^ - T I T h* r c J J ^ ' c t e f District 
Byt*5^  i i ^ i ;*•»)& PioSy I 
MAR 2 1 1997 
~ £•* p LAKE CO JNTY 
HARRY CASTON (4009) % ~ ; : i , ^ £ : n , i * i ^ 7 ^ ^ r 
MCKAY, BURTON & THURMAN V 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
10 East South Temple 
600 Gateway Tower East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
(801) 521-4135 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BRAD RUSSELL CHILDS, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
HEATHER T. CHILDS, 
Defendant. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 954901350DA 
Judge Tyrone E. Medley 
This matter came on for trial on October 30th, 31st and November 1st, 1996, the 
Honorable Tyrone E. Medley presiding. The plaintiff appeared in person and through his counsel 
of record, Harry Caston. The defendant appeared in person and through her counsel of record, 
Randy S. Ludlow. The Court took the matter under advisement and on January 31, 1997 issued 
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The Court having heard the testimony of the 
witnesses called by each party, having reviewed the pleadings, the custody evaluation and the 
evidence introduced at trial, and having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, does 
hereby ORDER, ADJUDGE AND DECREE: 
H^Tb 
1. The plaintiff is awarded a Decree of Divorce from the defendant on the grounds 
of irreconcilable differences, said Decree to be final upon entry. 
2. The plaintiff is awarded sole legal custody of the minor children, subject to the 
defendant's rights which at a minimum shall be defined as §30-3-35, Utah Code Annotated, which 
are fully set forth in Attachment "A." The Court also adopts the provisions of §30-3-33, Utah 
Code Annotated, also known as the "Advisory Guidelines" that are set forth in Attachment "B." 
3. That the plaintiff is awarded the tax dependency exemption for the minor children. 
4. That for as long as the plaintiff has insurance coverage available to him through 
his employment at a reasonable cost, he shall be required to maintain the same on behalf of the 
parties' minor children with each of the parties being responsible for one-half of the insurance 
premium that is attributable to the minor children. At the time of the Decree, one-half of the 
premium that is attributable to the parties' minor children equals $61.84 per month. 
5. All other expenses incurred on behalf of the parties' children, which are not 
covered by insurance, shall be equally born by each of the parties, including all deductibles and 
co-pays for medical, dental, orthodontic, optical and prescription costs. 
6. The defendant shall pay one half of the plaintiffs work-related daycare as is 
incurred on behalf of the parties' minor children. The plaintiff shall submit to the defendant 
verification of the monies paid out for daycare within ten days of the receipt of the same and the 
defendant shall reimburse the plaintiff one-half of the monies paid to the daycare provider within 
ten days of her receiving verification from the plaintiff. 
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7. The defendant is awarded a judgment in the total amount of $2500.00 consisting 
of an attorney's fee of $1,000.00 and a property distribution in the amount of $1500.00. Other 
than the $1,000.00 contribution that the plaintiff is ordered to make towards the defendant's 
attorney's fees, each party shall be solely responsible for their own attorney's fees and costs. 
8. Each party is to assume, pay and be solely responsible for any debt they have 
incurred since their separation. 
9. That based on the defendant's gross monthly income of $840.00 and utilizing the 
low income table, the defendant is ordered to pay child support in the amount of $184.00 per 
month, one half of which shall be due on the 5th and one half of which shall be due on the 20th 
of each month. 
10. That the defendant is awarded temporary alimony in the amount of $350.00 per 
month for a period of two years, beginning the first month after the entry of the Decree of 
Divorce. Alimony shall terminate upon the earliest occurrence of one of the following conditions: 
a) Two years from the entry of the Decree of Divorce; 
b) The defendant's remarriage; 
c) Upon establishment by the plaintiff that the defendant is co-habitating with 
another person. 
11. That the plaintiff is awarded the real property located at 13727 South Frontier 
Street, Riverton, Utah 84065. The plaintiff shall pay, assume and be solely responsible for the 
mortgage on the real property. The defendant shall quit claim her interest in the real property to 
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the plaintiff. The defendant shall be awarded an equitable lien against said real property in the 
amount of $34,000.00, which shall be payable on the earliest of the following conditions: 
a) The youngest child's graduation from high school, eighteenth birthday, or 
emancipation, whichever should occur last; 
b) Should the plaintiff co-habitate; 
c) Should the plaintiff sell the home or no longer use the home as his primary 
residence. 
12. The defendant is awarded the personal property items identified on page 2 of 
Exhibit nD-4." The plaintiff is awarded the children's furniture, refrigerator, washer, dryer, and 
all other personal property in the marital residence including the trailers. 
13. That the defendant's child support obligation shall be subject to automatic income 
withholding pursuant to § 62A-11-502 Utah Code Ann. etseq. 
14. That the Court denies the defendant's request made through the Request for 
Clarification that she be allowed to provide work-related daycare. The reasons for this denial are 
those Findings set forth in the Court's Findings of July 31, 1997 and those Findings and reasons 
set forth in the plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Request for Clarification. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the day of March, 1997, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document was hand delivered to the following: 
Randy S. Ludlow 
Attorney at Law 
311 South State, Suite 280 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 




KIM D. PETERSON, M.S.W. 
LICENSED CLINICAL SOCIAL WORKER 
Addendum 
Plaintiff: Brad & Childs 
Defendant: Heather Childs 
Case Number: 954901350 DA Date: November 12, 1995 
I have been informed by Heather and her attorney that Brad never legally adopted Alex 
and consequendy has no legal right to obtain custody. If the Court grants Heather 
custody of Alex based on the above legal issue, then the other two children should go 
with their mother as it is not in the children's best interest to separate them. 
Sincerely, 
Kim D. Peterson, M.S.W. 
Licensed Clinical Social Worker 
P O Box 58867 SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84158-0867 (801)588-3578 (801)649-3918 
